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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
CHARLES RANSOM, #85-A-1643,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND ORDER
RJI #16-1-2010-0244.47
INDEX # 2010-601
ORI #NY016015J

-against-

NEW YORK STATE DIVISION
OF PAROLE,
Respondent.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Charles Ransom, verified on April 23, 2010 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on May 3, 2010. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Franklin Correctional Facility, is challenging the February 2009 determination denying
him parole and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. The Court issued
an Order to Show Cause on May 6, 2010 and has received and reviewed respondent’s
Notice of Motion to dismiss, supported by the Affirmation of C. Harris Dague, Esq.,
Assistant Attorney General, dated June 24, 2010. Petitioner’s opposing papers were filed
in the Franklin County Clerk’s office on July 26, 2010.
Respondent’s motion to dismiss is premised upon the assertion that this
proceeding is time barred under the four-month statute of limitations set forth in CPLR
§217(1). According to the respondent the document perfecting petitioner’s administrative
appeal was received by the Division of Parole Appeals Unit on June 25, 2009. Citing 9
NYCRR §8006.4(c), the respondent goes on to assert that the Appeals Unit then had four
months to issue its findings and recommendation with respect to petitioner’s
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administrative appeal. Since such findings and recommendation were not issued within
the four-month time frame, respondent’s assert that “[o]n or about October 25, 2009,
petitioner’s administrative remedies were deemed exhausted, and the Parole Board’s
determination became final and binding.” (Citations omitted). Respondent concludes its
argument by asserting that petitioner therefore had until February 25, 2010 to timely
commence a CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging the February, 2009 discretionary
parole denial determination. The Court notes that this proceeding was not commenced
until May 3, 2010, when the petition was filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s office. See
CPLR §304(a).
In his opposing papers petitioner asserts that the respondent effectively granted
him additional time to amend or supplement the document perfecting his administrative
appeal when, under cover letter dated July 22, 2009, the Appeals Unit provided him with
a transcript of the underlying parole interview and advised him that “[i]f after reviewing
the transcript you wish to submit a supplemental brief, you may do so until August 28,
2009.” (Emphasis in original). Although there is nothing in the record to suggest that
petitioner submitted a supplemental brief, he argues that his administrative remedies
could not be considered exhausted until on or about December 28, 2009 (four months
after July 28, 2009). For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees.
Petitioner’s notice of administrative appeal, received by the Division of Parole
Appeals Unit on February 27, 2009, included a request for a transcript of the minutes of
the underlying parole hearing with a notation that such transcript was “necessary for the
preparation” of the administrative appeal. By regulation, petitioner had four months
from the date of filing of his notice of administrative appeal to perfect such appeal “. . .
unless an extension is granted by the appeals unit . . .” 9 NYCRR §8006.2(a). Although
petitioner met the initial perfection deadline, he did so without benefit of the requested
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transcript. When the Appeals Unit subsequently provided petitioner with a copy of the
transcript, on or about July 22, 2009, it specifically authorized petitioner to submit a
supplemental brief on or before August 28, 2009. Under these circumstances the Court
finds it difficult to perceive how the Appeals Unit could have meaningfully commenced
its review of petitioner’s administrative appeal until that August 28, 2009 deadline had
passed. Accordingly, the Court agrees that the Appeals Unit had until on or about
December 28, 2009, to issue its findings and recommendation under the provisions of 9
NYCRR §8006.4(c). With that in mind, the Court must still determine whether or not this
proceeding was timely commenced by the filing of the petition on May 3, 2010.
Petitioner asserts that his petition “ . . . was received by the Franklin County Clerk’s
Office and Verified on April 23, 2010" and that he is not responsible for the 11-day delay
in the filing of the petition. Petitioner should be aware, however, that the April 23, 2010
verification date does not refer to any action on behalf of the Franklin County Clerk but,
rather, to his own verification of the veracity of the contents of the petition, sworn to
before a notary at the Franklin Correctional Facility on April 23, 2009 before mailing.
The Court notes that petitioner’s cover letter to the Court accompanying his final mailing
of the petition and supporting documents is dated April 28, 2010. Although the exact date
of mailing cannot be determined, it obviously could not have been before April 28, 2010.
In any event, to the extent petitioner argues that the petition was mailed to the Court for
filing on or before April 28, 2010 (four months from December 28, 2009), although not
filed until May 3, 2010, this Court notes that in Grant v. Senkowski, 95 NY2d 605, the
Court of Appeals specifically declined to adopt a “mailbox rule” whereby the papers of pro
se inmate’s would be deemed “filed” upon delivery to prison authorities for forwarding to
the appropriate court. Rather, the Court of Appeals held that it was “ . . . the Legislature’s
intent to treat litigation papers as ‘filed’ within the meaning of CPLR 304 only upon the
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physical receipt of those papers by the court clerk or the clerk’s designee.” Id at 609. The
Court therefore finds that this proceeding was not commenced until the petition was filed
in the Franklin County Clerk’s office on May 3, 2010, regardless of the fact that the
petition was obviously mailed to the Court prior to that date. The rejection of petitioner’s
argument on this point, however, is only significant to the extent the four-month statute
of limitations set forth in CPLR §217(a) commenced running on December 28, 2009 and
therefore expired on April 28, 2010.
The burden of proving the applicability of the affirmative defense of statute of
limitations rest upon the party asserting it, here the respondent. See Jackson v. Fischer,
67 AD3d 1207 and Brush v. Olivo, 81 AD2d 852. “It is well settled that the Statute of
Limitations period does not begin to run until a petitioner receives notice of the final
administrative determination, and not upon the issuance thereof.” Warburton v.
Department of Correctional Services, 251 AD2d 831, 832, quoting Biondo v. New York
State Board of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834. See Jackson v. Fischer, 67 AD3d 1207.
Under the unusual regulatory scheme at play in this proceeding, respondent asserts
that the four-month statute of limitations set forth in CPLR §217(a) commenced running
not upon petitioner’s receipt of a final administrative determination but, rather, upon
administrative inaction as of a certain date. 9 NYCRR §8006.4(a)(2) provides, in relevant
part, that a perfected administrative appeal will be reviewed by the Appeals Unit and “ . . .
the appeals unit will issue written findings of fact and/or law, and recommend disposition
of the appeal. The written findings and recommendation of the appeals unit shall
thereupon be mailed to the inmate . . .” “Upon the issuance by the appeals unit of its
findings and recommendation the appeal will be presented as soon as practicable to three
members of the Board of Parole for determination.” 9 NYCRR §8006.4(b). “Should the
appeals unit fail to issue its findings and recommendation within four months of the date
4 of 6

[* 5]

that the perfected appeal was received, the appellate may deem this administrative
remedy to have been exhausted, and thereupon seek judicial review of the underlying
determination from which the appeal was taken. In that circumstance, the division will
not raise the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy as a defense to such
litigation.” 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c).
Although the Court has determined that the Appeals Unit in the case at bar had
until December 28, 2009 to issue its findings and recommendation, the petitioner,
incarcerated in DOCS custody, would have no way of knowing that the Appeals Unit failed
to issue such findings and recommendation on or before December 28, 2009 - and thus
that the four-month statute of limitations had therefore commenced running - until a
reasonable period of time elapsed after December 28, 2009 without his receipt of a copy
of the findings and recommendation. It is clear to the Court, therefore, that the statute
of limitations in this case cannot be considered as having commenced running on
December 28, 2009. Without attempting to establish any broadly applicable rule as to
how soon after the expiration of a 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c) deadline, without the Appeals
Unit having issued its findings and recommendation, it is reasonable to conclude that the
four-month statute of limitations has commenced running, the Court finds that statute
of limitations in the case at bar did not commence running before January 3, 2010 and,
therefore, this proceeding was timely commenced on May 3, 2010.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ORDERED, that respondent’s motion to dismiss is denied; and it is further
ORDERED, that respondent serve a copy of his answering papers on the
petitioner on or before August 27, 2010, and that he simultaneously mail his original
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answering papers to the Clerk of the Court for filing, and mail a further copy of said
answering papers to the undersigned; and it is further
ORDERED, that petitioner mail his original Reply to the respondent’s answering
papers to the Court Clerk’s office, Franklin County Courthouse, 355 West Main Street,
Suite 3223, Malone, New York, 12953, on or before September 10, 2010.

Dated:

August 9, 2010 at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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